Theology and human rights

The work of the Lutheran World Federation

Jan-Olav Henriksen

In this article, I briefly review the work of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) on a theological understanding and interpretation of human rights, in the hope of shedding light on issues relevant to the understanding of a Lutheran position on this question. The presentation limits itself to work done in and after the Fifth General Assembly in Evian (1970), and it excludes specific human rights cases that the LWF has addressed. It is based on written material, and is almost solely orientated towards what can be called work on a theology of human rights. Therefore, the presentation is systematic-theological in nature, although trying not to ignore historical circumstances totally.

Evian as a starting point

Evian "marked a new stage in the history of the Lutheran churches. They were no longer willing to consider theological and doctrinal problems in isolation, but in direct relation to their implications for the church's mission in the world."¹ The theological focus on human rights and human rights violations found its source in this assembly. This was mainly because the assembly should have gathered in Porto Alegre, Brazil, but due to the political unrest in Brazil in the early summer of 1970, the assembly location was altered at short notice. This provided the immediate context for what is described as "one of the most important results" of Evian, namely the document on human rights.²

We find the most direct reference to human rights as an important issue in "Responsible Participation in Today's Society", the report from Section III of the Evian assembly.³ Here, the close relationship between economic justice and human rights is affirmed. Not much is to be found in terms of explicit theological reflection. There is a statement saying that we need a dynamic review and a continuing development of human rights, but that this does not change the basic and normative principle of these rights. This principle is the integrity and the dignity of the individual. The member churches of the LWF are urged to support the significance of human rights with all their influence. It seems fair to say that the report deals mainly with concrete issues, and tries to spell out how the Christian community can deal with them.

We can see, however, that human rights are taken to be God-given,⁴ that it is judged "appropriate and necessary for Christian churches to scrutinize" human rights conditions in their respective national situations,⁵ and that member churches are urged to study and use the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁶

The Evian assembly thus triggered off a process in the LWF which led to more reflection on how the churches should deal with human rights issues. This process included study work and consultations both by experts and by different member churches.

"Theological perspectives on human rights"

In the years following the Evian Assembly many Lutheran churches issued statements on their understanding of human rights.⁷ Based on this material, a consultation was held in Geneva in the summer of 1976. This consultation ended with a three-part document called Theological Perspectives on Human Rights. As this document provides an assessment of the responses from the churches, and also gives some basic elements for a Lutheran understanding of human rights, I will give some space for it in the following. I will also offer some comments on elements that I find important from a Lutheran point of view.

The document says that the participants did find a wide consensus in the evaluation and interpretation of human rights. Already on one of the first pages, it says that one of the challenges for a Lutheran church is to make clear what significance characteristic elements of Lutheran theology, such as Lutheran ecclesiology and the doctrine of the two kingdoms, have for a theological understanding of human rights.⁸

The document goes on to state two basic reasons why the Lutheran churches address issues concerning human rights. The first is that secular human rights are a necessary reminder to the churches of the biblical demand for justice.⁹

To say that human rights are secular or worldly instruments seems appropriate not only in terms of the actual genesis of human rights in secularized Europe. But even as an expression of a more secularized ethos, human rights can be seen as linked to the ethos of the Bible. The "overlap" between human rights and biblical thinking is thus recognized, without attempting to Christianize human rights. As we will see later, this framework for understanding human rights also proves fruitful on the more concrete level.

The second reason is that it is the duty of the Christian church to stand for the rights of human beings and for a better community of nations.¹⁰

In this statement we can note two elements that are important for Lutheran ethics. First, one of the church's tasks is to address things that are important for the well-being of humankind. The church exists to serve the world. Second, this means that the church cannot withdraw itself into a spiritualistic isolation from worldly matters. It has to be concerned with issues that are of "bodily" importance, for believers and nonbelievers alike.

The report says that for some churches, the violation of human rights is something that does not appear to happen in their own countries. However, such violations still affect the church members as something that happens to their brothers and sisters.¹¹ One could say that the consciousness of these violations strengthens the experience of solidarity among church members from different countries.

Another element that should be mentioned is that the Lutherans do not see themselves alone in the struggle for the promotion of respect for human rights. The 1977 report refers explicitly to the WARC document, The Theological Basis of Human Rights (1976), and to efforts by other agencies, including the WCC, but also by other institutions and organizations not related to the church.

Seen in a Lutheran perspective, there is no surprise in such a position, as this reflects the recognition of what everyone is capable of doing as right in the public realm. However, the efforts by others do not stand alone: the reason why the Lutherans should engage in this realm is that the situation presents us with so much to be done, and that it is far from what is unconditionally necessary in order to be recognized as an acceptable fulfilment of human needs.¹² This could be taken to say that if the world were better, the church could address other matters, and leave human rights to others.

When the report looks more concretely into the theological understanding of human rights, it deals with them in sequence: as the rights to freedom, equality and participation. It does not consider it appropriate to deduce human rights from specific theological presuppositions. They are the rights of every human being, including those outside the reach of the gospel. The Lutheran tradition makes it possible to understand human rights as a phenomenon in the worldly regiment of God, and to make a theological assessment of them from this basis. Hence, they do not find a simple legitimation in Christian faith, but are dealt with in a critical and constructive manner. The report is careful to avoid the misinterpretation that the integration of the rights in the secular realm leads to their autonomy, so that they are not in any way related to Christian faith. We need a reason illuminated by the law and the gospel and guided by love in order to deal responsibly with human rights and their realization.¹³

The right to freedom is interpreted as expressing the fact that every human being is free, i.e., not something to be freely manipulated (unverfügbar). It is not the grace of the State or something else that secures this freedom. It is given with the humanity of the human being. Hence, this freedom is based on something that transcends the empirical human being. Simultaneously, it is a promise of the humanity implicit in human rights. Theologically speaking, the deeper meaning of this is expressed in the doctrine of justification. It is God's action that gives human beings their freedom and dignity. Thus, a correspondence between human rights and theology is affirmed.¹⁴

The right to equality can be seen by theology as an expression of the fact that every human is created in the image of God. This equality gives every human being the same dignity, even if it appears as corrupted by our actions. However, here we can have a double view of the human being: As Jesus is the true human being, who liberates us from sin, he also renews every human being's destiny to live as the image of God. Therefore, both creation and redemption give a deeper understanding of the equality of every human being.¹⁵

The right to participation is interpreted theologically via the notion of the body of Christ, whose unity is expressed through the baptism of all believers, a notion that also includes the priesthood of all believers. The rights of the believers to participate in the community, are given, regardless of social status and personal qualities.

The document adds two comments to this way of setting up an analogy between church and the community: First, it says that this right to participation on equal terms is not yet fully realized in the church. It is a promise not yet fulfilled. Second, it says that the rights of Christians in the believing community are not something that can be transferred to a community constituted by common law. But where such rights are realized in the public realm, Christians can recognize them as important for the humanity of humankind.¹⁶ Hence, the obvious limits of this analogy are taken into consideration.

As one can see, this way of interpreting human rights assumes that there can be a kind of analogy between important elements in Christian anthropology and ethics and what is stated in the concrete human rights formulae. By stating an analogy, and thereby assuming some kind of "overlap", this way of interpreting human rights can both state similarities and still maintain that there are differences. As the report says, these concepts denote no identity but, on the contrary, keep open a difference between the justice that applies in the kingdom of God and the justice that applies in worldly human law. The latter should remain conscious of its boundaries and not seek to achieve, by force of law, things which can only emanate from spontaneity and love.¹⁷

The difference also means that the life in faith implies a surplus of love and hope that is inspiring and creative in its effects. Hence, it motivates us when we confront negative experiences in the struggle for justice. Thus, faith is seen as a better motivation for the struggle for justice through human rights than reason alone. Worldly law can only be sustained by reason, but "Christian experience teaches us that reason for its part needs love in order to remain rational".¹⁸

The double commandment of love is identified as the basic criterion for Christians when it comes to the interpretation and application of human rights in concrete situations.¹⁹ The task in concrete cases is a double one: creative and critical. Creative, in the perception that stems from and is inspired by faith, so that it "perceives in an unconstrained way the good thing which appears at any given moment".²⁰ Critical, in the sense that it can make a distinction between "ideological shamming and the realization of human rights".

The model of analogy and difference that lies at the bottom of this way of reflecting is used several times in the material we find in the LWF publications. Later, I shall address it more specifically. Here we note only that some of the statements so far referred to could be taken to indicate that Christians are in a better position to promote and find applications for human rights than non-Christians. In my view, one should be careful about opening up such interpretations. The 1977 paper balances such statements by addressing the failure of Christians in this field and the necessity of self-criticism.

Given the more recent debate on "ecological rights", it is worth noting that in parts of the 1977 document ecological issues are reflected already. Mainly they are dealt with as questions of how to distribute resources in the best way possible, and not to destroy the conditions that will make it possible for future (human?) generations to live.²¹ However, the text also addresses the misreading of Gen. 1.28 on the dominium terrae that leads to an anthropocentric understanding where human beings exploit the created world instead of serving as stewards of creation. The dignity of human beings obliges them to care for and order the earth for the other creatures, and to make use of their rights only in consonance with the needs of other creatures, so that the biosphere remains unharmed (unbeschädigt).²²

To sum up this brief presentation of elements in the 1977 document: it states without reservation that the churches have an obligation to raise their voice whenever injustice is done to the neighbour. This implies a co-responsibility for what happens in the political realm. The churches have to take the side of the oppressed and to criticize existing abuses without regard for their own rights.²³

Analogy and difference

It is obvious that the 1977 document has been greatly influenced by the work of Heinz Eduard Tödt and Wolfgang Huber.²⁴ In their book Menschenrechte - Perspektiven einer menschlichen Welt,²⁵ they deal extensively with the problems. Both the ordering of human rights in groups of rights to freedom, equality and participation, and the model of analogy and difference can be found in that book. The relevant sections are also reprinted in the volume of materials for understanding human rights that formed the basis for the 1976 consultation in Geneva.²⁶ Here, I will outline their presentation of different models for developing a theological understanding of human rights. I do so because I think we find in their listing of models a very precise instrument that can be of great help in the actual work with theological interpretation of human rights. Much of the other material does not address the issues with such clarity, although it offers many valuable insights on how one could interpret human rights from the perspective(s) of Lutheran theology.

Huber and Tödt reconstruct five basic models for how to relate theological concepts to the notion of human rights. Each of these models has advantages, but also some problems. Briefly, the models are as follows:

1. The deductive model, where one deduces human rights from specific theological axioms. Interestingly enough, the WARC document belongs in this category. Here, the universality of the gospel and the universality of human rights are connected in a relation where the gospel is the basis for the actual human rights.

The problem with this approach can be indicated by the following critical questions:

• Does it reflect the actual, secular historical development of human rights?
• How does one interpret the juridical character of human rights in this framework?
• Does it provide a sharp enough understanding of human rights? Does it not lead to a too general concept of human rights, which is dissolved into political aims that are hard to evaluate on the basis of theological criteria?

2. The double-basis model. Human rights are based both on human reason, and on the fact that the human being is created in the image of God. This model is mainly found in Roman Catholic thought, and is an expression of the common understanding between Christians and non-Christians on the content of human rights. For Christians, the obligations expressed in human rights are however to be seen as coming from divine commands.

The problem with this model is that it is not able to connect the universality of the gospel with the universality of human rights - because the theological interpretation is added as something relevant only for the believers. Also, it does not clarify either the legal character of human rights or their relation to basic rights (Grundrechten)

3. The third model tries to do without any specifically theological legitimation of human rights. Because they are not the fruits of Christian theology, they should not be legitimated by theology nor reclaimed for Christian faith. This position is taken by Martin Honecker, who sees human rights as expressions of a naturally given ethos that is partly at odds with the particular Christian ethos. Human rights are linked to processes of secularization, rationalization and universalization, and any theological grounding of them would threaten their universal character. In this, he takes the historical development far more into consideration than the previously referred models do.

The gain of this model, then, is that it makes it easy to interpret and state the legal character of the rights. Also, it is easy to see how they are valid, independently of specific religious or other world-views.

But as Huber and Tödt contend, there is a question whether theological ethics would be possible at all on the basis of such a way of thinking. They find in Honecker's position a tendency to identify universality with the results of secularization and rationalization. Also, Honecker's model has a tendency to neglect the relevance of Christian faith for the development of ethical standards.

4. The next model takes its point of departure from the fact that there does not exist at present any foundation of human rights that is universally recognized as valid. However, the controversies over the foundation do not dissolve the immediate basis (Evidenz) that is behind every proclamation of human rights - the immediate basis given in and with the appeal to the human being and the freedom of the human person as such.

Trutz Rendtorff has seen this as an indication that theological work on the understanding of human rights is not a question of foundation or legitimation, but should consist in an analysis of the function of these rights. They function as bringing into reality a legal order that takes care of the humanity of humankind, and make it clear that the freedom and humanity of the person are not created, but only secured, by legal authority and government. The theological thought-form corresponding to this is the doctrine of justification. The political implication of this is that the government has an obligation to secure a form of society in which human freedom is exercised. In this sense, Rendtorff can say that there exists a structural analogy between the doctrine of justification and human rights.

Though Huber and Tödt follow Rendtorff in the understanding of analogy, they say that there is still a need to deal with how to establish a theological basis for human rights. Also, they find Rendtorff taking human rights to be more unambiguous and self-evident than they actually are: in fact, they are contested. Rendtorff's picture of human rights takes its point of departure from the freedom of the individual. The elements of equality and participation retreat into the background. It is also open to question to what extent a Christian and a modern understanding of freedom actually correspond.

5. The fifth model is the model that is applied in the 1977 LWF document, and we have already seen how it works. It does not ask for a theological foundation of human rights, but why Christians should promote human rights and how theology should estimate or evaluate them. By addressing the issue in this way, it takes both the historical background and the present situation fully into account. It also makes it possible to appreciate the legal character of the actual rights, without making them "theological" in a way that makes their content less distinctive. One could perhaps call this a model of interpretation of human rights from a theological perspective, which finds resources of motivation in Christian faith that is not inherent in the rights themselves.

In a paper presented in another LWF publication on human rights, Carl Braaten says that the Lutheran view presented by Huber and Tödt and applied in the 1977 document starts from below, from common experience, and from outside the theological circle, and then proceeds to find correspondences to Christian faith. This is a different position from the Reformed view, which starts from above (from God's claim on the human being) and from within (the covenant community).²⁷

Huber and Tödt group human rights in three: freedom, equality and participation. Although they are conscious of the ecological conditions for the possible fulfilment of these rights, one could ask to what extent this way of grouping the rights may fully integrate the issues raised in the ongoing debate on ecological rights.

How Christian are human rights?

The interconfessional differences

Although there are occasional statements that address confessional differences in the approach to human rights, these are rare, and cannot be said to be part of a real ongoing interconfessional dialogue. This situation serves as a background for the publication How Christian are Human Rights? Here the editor, Eckehart Lorenz, states that "it is particularly necessary to try to look at human rights from a specifically confessional angle... The more precise the concept of human rights in a church's tradition, the more understandable will decisions about human rights be within that church and the more effective the theological legitimation and motivation."²⁸

Now, this is not everything that may be said, because the confessional point of departure needs to be overcome for ethical reasons: "...in ecumenical work convictions about social ethics have a uniting or dividing force to some extent similar to the force of the confessions of faith in the past. This is one of the reasons why unity must be sought also on the basic concept of human rights."²⁹

On the initiative of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, representatives of seven confessional bodies started meeting in 1978 to exchange ideas on the theological basis for human rights. However, the issues soon turned out to be too large to be properly dealt with in this group. In 1980, then, there was a meeting on a more modest scale to deal with the theological basis of human rights, to compare different positions, uncover agreement, and outline problems and further tasks. In this consultation, there were representatives of Reformed, Lutheran and Orthodox theology.

From the conclusions of this consultation, we note the following:

• Although human rights are secular in character, the word secular does not only mean worldly as opposed to spiritual. It also asserts the global validity of human rights, which implies that theology does not give this issue up to an "ungodly" world.
• there is still a lack of common legitimation in the world for the promotion and realization of human rights. In this situation, a Christian basis of human rights must interact with other approaches and thus relate its position to other viewpoints.
• "All theological statements on human rights derive from the Christian anthropology of the human person made in the image of God." This gives the human being its inviolable and inalienable dignity.³⁰

The consultation lists several approaches to human rights from this common starting point of view: from the doctrine of creation and natural law, from the recognition of humankind in Christ, from the covenant of God with his people, or from the justification of sinners through God's grace as the basis of freedom and responsibility.³¹ Clearly, these different approaches reflect the different ways in which doctrinal positions generally are developed inside the different confessions. Hence, we should not be surprised that we do not find much more doctrinal agreement than the common point of departure in the imago dei. There is also, however, a common understanding that "the recognition and implementation of human rights takes place in a world that is no longer God's good creation and not yet the kingdom of God". Due to this, the participants in this interconfessional consultation disagree with the humanist optimism connected to past formulations of human rights in Europe and America.³²

Other work related to specific issues

Before the Seventh General Assembly of the LWF (Budapest, 1984), there was a consultation on criteria for public statements or silence by the LWF on human rights issues. This was a following up of a recommendation at the Sixth Assembly (Dar es Salaam, 1977). The consultation dealt with several issues that the LWF had faced as problematic. Should one deal with human rights violations in a diverse manner, and on what basis could one differentiate between different types of action or silence in different contexts? Was the apartheid politics of South Africa more than a human rights violation? Was it not also a casus confessions? What was the relationship between human rights violations and status confessionis? In general, the consultation provided a differentiated basis for the evaluation of statements, contexts, addressees and forms of public statements by the LWF. However, it did not provide much more in terms of a specific theological understanding of human rights as such. It did, however, demonstrate the split in the Lutheran churches themselves with regard to the ability to recognize a political regime responsible for large human rights violations as guilty of theological heresy. Critical voices will say that the debate on criteria for "to speak or not to speak" was an attempt to lay dead the suggestion to make apartheid a reason for declaring a status confessionis.³³

The Budapest assembly:

Human rights as an indispensable basis for society

The Budapest assembly passed a statement on human rights that gave them more weight than previously in terms of their significance for building a just society:

"Human rights are an indispensable basis for a just and participatory society. Peace cannot be without justice; justice cannot be realized except in peace. Human rights are indivisible. The basic human rights, including self-determination and the right to live in peace and with individual integrity, cannot be implemented unless social conditions and political structures are justly ordered."³⁴

Although this is not a theological statement, it clearly suggests what kind of importance is given to human rights by the LWF assembly. To say that human rights are indispensable is to affirm their importance for developing a political order necessary in a modern, pluralistic world. The statement also stresses the interdependence between good political structures and the implementation of human rights. When we note that this is not a theological statement, this is also because one could perhaps have said the same with reference to the law of God, but such a statement would not have the political and legal operationality that presently belongs to references to human rights.

Conclusion

This review of work done by and in connection with the LWF study processes on human rights shows that is is possible and legitimate to interpret human rights in a theological framework. However, such an interpretation needs to consider the historical processes behind the development of a modern concept of human rights - a historical development that in many ways takes its place outside theological and ecclesial frameworks.

The LWF process shows that concern for human rights starts in the actual world order, and in the practices where people live and experience violations of such rights. From this, and on the basis of denominational resources, a model is developed for the interpretation of human rights that can attribute theological significance to them, but also affirm their secular basis and historical genesis outside the church. This model can serve as an important element in ecumenical dialogue on the theological understanding of human rights. However, it is intrinsically linked to concerns that are more or less specifically Lutheran:

• the distinction between the worldly and the spiritual regiment of God;
• the distinction between law and Gospel, hence also reason and faith/love;
• the affirmation of the positive work of the law of God in all creatures;
• the ecclesial co-responsibility of the Lutheran church with other humans for what is happening in the world of God.

We have also seen that it is possible to interpret human rights by analogy with the central doctrine of Lutheranism: the doctrine of justification by faith. Therefore, a theological interpretation of human rights in Lutheranism can take its point of departure in the doctrines both of creation and of redemption. In this way, it provides motivation and an interpretative framework for the Lutheran churches when they deal with human rights issues. In carrying out this work, the LWF has also contributed to the clarification of confessional differences in the approach to human rights, although these differences have not yet been resolved or abandoned.

Jan-Olav Henriksen teaches at the Norwegian Lutheran School of Theology in Oslo.

Notes