The rights to development and economic justice

Julio de Santa Ana

An impressive evolution characterizes the debate on human rights during the last 50 years. Since the time when the UN General Assembly proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the awareness of public opinion all around the world concerning the necessity to defend and implement human rights has grown remarkably. There are powers (both political and economic) which unfortunately still threaten human rights. Nevertheless, it must be recognised that since the foundation of Amnesty International in 1955, many NGOs (including some ecclesiastical bodies and religious communities) have made a valuable contribution to building up the consciousness that human rights have to be affirmed, defended and improved. The influence of these civilian sectors cannot be disqualified by political powers and economic interests. These people's organizations are one of the most important sources of the affirmation of human rights. Human rights are a matter of people who struggle for them and influence the powers-that-be, up to the point that the latter accept people's claims.

One of the dangers that we have to avoid when we reflect on human rights is that of falling into an easy idealism. Theoretically, all human beings (even the most authoritarian!) accept human rights. But not all are ready to implement them and to defend them. One of the characteristics of the language of those advocating human rights is the use of imperatives: "the State should...", "the authorities have to...", "the corporations must..." When these verbs are used, it is because these stipulated behaviours are not forthcoming. And they will not become part of reality just because rhetoric points out that they "should", "have to", or "must be".

Very often, when we deal with human rights, there is a clear gap between the level of ideas and the realm of the peoples' concrete struggles. If human rights are valuable (that is, if they express human values), it is because people are ready to pay a price for them. When rhetoric is a tool of negotiation, it is fair to suspect that the rights that should be, are not really as valuable as some intend that they are. This is part of the problem of the rights to develop and to social justice.

A distinction must be made between the two. The right to social justice has been more easily accepted at the level of formal statements than the right to development. For example, the right to social justice is implicitly recognized in the Universal Declaration of 1948 (cf. arts. 22-28) and reaffirmed more clearly in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which was opened for signature by member States by the UN General Assembly in December 1966 and entered into force on 3 January 1976.

The situation of the claim for the right to development is different. The International Covenant implicitly alludes to this right in arts. 7-9, 11 and 13, where there is a mention that through the right to education human beings are orientated to "the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity". At the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights (1993), the right to develop was one of the issues which gave rise to hot debates. By now, it is clear that there is still a long way to go before the acceptance of this right. It will depend above all on people's efforts to achieve development which could be accepted as such by a substantive proportion of the populations concerned.

The formulation of human rights standards

The French philosopher, Paul Ricoeur, makes a very interesting point in commenting on John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass., 1971). Ricoeur insists that we do not first seek justice. Human praxis indicates that we start to look for justice when we become aware of the injustice which is imposed on us. This is an unbearable experience; human beings refuse to be broken, to lose their basic integrity. So we react against the powers of injustice This resistance to injustic and oppression needs a certain orientation. The idea of justice is rooted in the struggle against injustice: "(...) even among philosophers, it is (the experience of) injustice which puts reflection and thinking in movement".¹ Thus, we think about the legal problem of impunity because it is unfair that those who have violated human rights are not penalized for their crimes. "It is unjust", people claim. This awareness is the starting point for moving towards justice. We do not have, to begin with, a clear idea of what justice is. We start to walk towards it, and gradually we begin to characterize what justice can be. These characterizations are useful elements which enable us to formulate standards and criteria that most human beings can recognize as being manifestations of justice.² The formulation of human rights has been above all a search for standards and criteria which people agree to respect and defend. This has been a painful process: many paid with their lives the search for these standards. This process is still underway.

The first rights which were formulated (following the struggle of the American peoples for their independence, and of the bourgeois French people against the feudal nobility) were limited. They were rights of "man", understood as "citizen". They were civic and political rights. They provided the basis for the development of what has been called "the first generation of human rights".

The second generation of human rights came into being through the struggles of the social movements interested in social and economic justice. Trade unions, political movements, played a decisive role with their struggles for the acceptance of these rights. In the formulation of these rights we find the recognition of the social dimension of human beings. The social movements influenced by Marxist assumptions have been the most important agents in creating conditions for the recognition of these standards.

The difference between the "first generation" and the "second generation" of rights is clear: the former is about "citizens", individuals, while the second one is concerned with the social and economic organization of national societies.

Eric Hobsbawm asserts that the period between the beginning of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1970s was one in which very important social progress was made in many realms, including human rights.³ Although this claim needs to be qualified, it can be accepted at least in general terms. It was during these twenty years that the international debate on "development" gained momentum. The goal was to overcome poverty, oppression, and the illiteracy of many, to bring health care to all, etc. That is, the struggle was against what some called "underdevelopment". Since the end of the 1950s, the international community has been aware that this effort needs the participation and collaboration of all. Which means that if development is a right, it is not one of the same type as those of the first and second generations of human rights.

Therefore, those who support the right to develop started to talk about the "third generation" of human rights. These rights are not only collective (as those of the second generation), but related to the life of given nations (the underdeveloped or the "developing"). The observance of this right would enable these nations to affirm the identity of their people in social, economic, political and cultural terms. Hence, the right to develop has been seen as a people's right.

Facing the problem

One might think, in the light of the foregoing, that there should be no problem in recognizing the right to development. In fact, there is a strong debate on the possibility of affirming this right, as well as about its meaning. I am convinced that if we want to affirm it, it is necessary to build up some convergence about the meaning of development. I am not so optimistic as to require a consensus on the meaning of the development process. Nevertheless, the challenge that we face is that development be perceived at least as a common standard by all peoples of the world.

Here lies an important part of the problem. Those who want to develop do not agree among themselves about the content of this concept; and the disagreement is even greater between the underdeveloped, those who are already in the process of development, and the already "developed".

The privileged position reached by the last (at least in relative material terms) leads them to present themselves as paradigmatic. Those who are underdeveloped or in the process of developing, they say, should follow the model of their experiences. Many of those who want to develop, however, do not accept the experience of those who claim to be successful. When, for example, the South Commission, chaired by Julius Nyerere, former President of Tanzania, and made up of 30 prominent personalities from the underdeveloped or developing countries of the South, talks about "development", it says:

"To sum up: development is a process of self-reliant growth, achieved through the participation of the people acting in their interests as they see them, and under their own control. Its first objective must be to end poverty, provide productive employment, and satisfy the basic needs of all the people, any surplus being fairly shared. This implies that basic goods and services such as food and shelter, basic education and health facilities, and clean water must be accessible to all. In addition, development presupposes a democratic structure of government, together with its supporting individual freedoms of speech, organization, and publication, as well as a system of justice which protects all the people from actions inconsistent with just laws, that are known and publicly accepted."⁴

It is remarkable that the members of the "South Commission" do not emphasize economic achievements, but social goals. The key word in this definition is "people", without exclusion. It is a comprehensive understanding of development. Even growth is qualified as being "self-reliant" growth. This understanding of development is shared neither by the majority of the developed nations' authorities, nor by many governments of the South. There are two points of basic disagreement.

First, the governments of developed nations emphasize that development is economic growth, measured by the indicators of international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). Developing and underdeveloped nations, in order to show that they are growing according to these indicators, need investments which, in most cases, they cannot make themselves. They are dependent on foreign investments, the influence of which is not limited only to the economic sphere (very often the sources of investment become strong actors in the national political realm). Or they have to borrow money from international banks. This has been a major element in the building up of the international debt of developing and underdeveloped nations, affecting them very negatively not only at the economic level of their life, but also at the social, the economic and the cultural levels as well. This problem of how to measure development is one of the most polemical when the right to develop is discussed.

Second, many governments of developing and underdeveloped countries understand that, in order to create appropriate conditions for an economic take-off which could put the nation on the road to development, it is necessary that during a certain period the authority of the State should play a strong role. They assume that the relationship between political issues and economic ones cannot be dissociated. Furthermore, they manifest a certain praxis which expresses a technocratic view of development, as if development did not have to do with people, but with economic efficiency, for which a strong and authoritarian government is necessary. Unavoidably, when this situation has been created (as, for example, in Latin America, Indonesia, South Korea, etc., when the National Security State managed by the military was imposed on these nations), the basic assumption (held steadfastly by a good number of development theoreticians of the North and of the South) is that a strong and centralized government with dictatorial powers is better able to embark on rapid economic development and to take radical measures aimed at the removal of poverty and inequity among the majority of the population. A strong State seems to be the best instrument for the implementation of the fundamental steps for development. Without the strong action of the State no readjustment can exist. And, without readjustment, it is not possible to have competitive conditions which ensure economic growth. Hence the third-generation right to develop cannot exist without violating first- and second-generation rights.

It is important to recognize, then, that the experience of many "developing" countries which have followed this authoritarian approach does not support this belief. Most present a picture of a "high level of economic mismanagement accompanied by an increase in disparities and deterioration in the conditions of the poorer sections of the people. Even where, either through large-scale foreign corporate investment or through the process of internal exploitation by a local industrial and bureaucratic élite, high rates of economic growth have been achieved for a few years, the benefits of such growth have been cornered by a small élite. Practically no thought is given to initiating basic structural changes involving a better distribution of land or of income and employment, with the result that the condition of ordinary people actually deteriorates."⁵

Neither the approach based on economic growth, benefits of which would start some day or another to trickle down to the underprivileged sectors of society, nor the bureaucratic line which calls for authoritarian governments, satisfy the expectations of the majority of the people who claim the right to develop. The tension, unfortunately, does not allow to reach to a convergence about the substance of this right.

For those who defend the existence of the right to development as one of the rights of the third generation (peoples' rights), changes are necessary. Their vision of change is called utopian by others, who intend to be "realistic". This contradiction between utopian reason and the realism which affirms that we have to work with facts, no matter how hard they are, makes it impossible to formulate the right which we are talking about on the basis of some common agreement.

Two different rationalities inform the two contrasting lines of thought. The logic of the market, competitiveness, instrumentality, and efficiency supports the arguments which claim to be realistic. The logic that introduces into the present the seeds of a future of human societies in which justice, fairness, freedom and respect for other human rights prevail characterizes the utopian line.

Overcoming the contradiction

Unless the confrontation of the two lines, the two logics, can be managed with some fruitfulness, the right to develop will continue to be rhetorical. At this point it is important to underline the position of the report of the South Commission: it is not a challenge of the South, but a challenge to the South! This means that those who want to develop are challenged to liberate themselves from the bewitchment that the model of the North exercises upon them.

Here we find, once again, the process that led in the past to the formulation and widespread acceptance of the human rights of the first and the second generation. Denunciation of oppression and injustice is necessary. However, denunciation without a praxis of change does not contribute much to the implementation, defence and promotion of the standards of human rights. Therefore, efforts are necessary to accumulate and organize forces to fight for social justice and development:

"The challenge of the South is to enable its people to realize the full potential of their talents and creativity, and to develop self-confidence, and to mobilize their contribution to the well-being and progress of their societies...

The challenge to the South is to organize itself effectively and to seek strength through wide-ranging joint undertakings of South-South cooperation which benefit from complementary resources and increase collective self-reliance.

The challenge to the South is to use its unity and solidarity in efforts to make the world a more just and more secure home for all its people, through a restructuring of global relationships that responds to the growing intimations of the interdependence of the world's nations and people: members of one human family living in one world."⁶

The right to develop as a people's right will be substantiated when certain nations can give substance to their claim. That is, when they are able to affirm themselves, to be faithful to their national awareness, acquiring the necessary empowerment which will enable them to fulfil their hopes as part of humanity.

Certain conditions seem to be necessary for the formulation and implementation of this right. They are related to the rights of the first and the second generation. I shall try to indicate them quickly, realizing that they need a more careful elaboration than can be given to them in this presentation.

First, it has been already indicated that development happens when there is some kind of self-reliant growth. That is, when people become themselves and affirm their identity. At this point a helpful distinction is made by Samuel Parmar, an Indian economist who contributed a lot to the ecumenical reflection on development: self-reliance is one thing, autonomy another. In many cases, full autonomy, understood as self-sufficiency or autarky, cannot be practised: we live in a world where we need each other. Nevertheless, it is possible to be self-reliant without being self-sufficient. Parmar indicates that one of the levels where self-reliance is manifested is that of ideas, values, goals. One problem in the relations between the North and the South is that very often the developed impose their views on the developing and underdeveloped nations. Unfortunately, it has to be recognised that many people in the South also think that to develop is to become like the affluent industrialized nations. They are enchanted by those who seem to have attained wealth. When this happens (and it happens every day and in every place in the South), then the people lose their ability to develop their own ideas, their ingenuity.

It is necessary that they liberate themselves from the bewitchment of the powerful. The praxis of self-reliance cannot be without liberation, both of peoples and individuals. This is one of the points which shows the link between the first and the third generation of human rights.⁷ Unfortunately, at the end of this century there is at the same time a wide consensus on the need for formal liberal democracy as the best way to organize the life of the nations of the world politically, and a kind of tyranny of the market powers in the economic realm of life. We live in the age of "globalization", and in order to become part of the global market, people have to pay very high social costs (Special Adjustment Programmes, for example). Those who are unable to pay are simply excluded: they are dispensable, they do not really count. Therefore. they do not have the right to develop.

This situation will continue unless we affirm our freedom as peoples confronting what Assmann and Hinkelammert have called "the totalitarianism of the market".⁸ Markets are devices which human beings have created. When we bow in front of markets, then we are no longer free. Relativizing markets, demystifying the powers which act behind "the veil of economics",⁹ is one of the steps in the process of liberation at the end of this century. Unless we take it, liberation will not happen... And development will not take place either.

Second, a long process of reflection among the "non-aligned countries", culminated in the vote, at the 6th Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1974, in favour of the creation of a "new international economic order" (NIEO). This decision was reiterated at the end of the summer 1975. However, it was never implemented. The new international economic order is a precondition for the development of the developing and underdeveloped nations. The proposal for a NIEO aimed at gradually overcoming the patterns of domination and dependence that the world has received as a legacy from the period when Western colonialism prevailed. Political colonialism has been followed by economic colonialism (neocolonialism, as it was defined by N'Kwame N'Krumah, the Ghanaian leader), shaping an economic system which inhibits the development of the former colonized peoples. Economic relations are so constructed that they bring wealth for those who have economic power and impoverish the others. The proposal for an NIEO wanted to break with this pattern. It is an obvious need if we want that the right to develop be more than rhetoric.

When the South Commission calls for an intensification of economic and cultural relationships among the peoples and nations of the South, it is proposing to start the process of building up a new economic order on the planet.

Unfortunately, the proposal voted in 1974 and confirmed in 1975 has been opposed by capitalist and socialist industrialized countries. Furthermore, the élites of the South have clearly manifested their will to dissociate themselves from this proposal. That is, they oppose the peoples to whom they belong. The matter is crucial because if there is no reform of the international economic order, the right to development will not be considered as a real possibility.

This problem is related to self-determination. We all know that very often this principle is used as an argument by governments which violate the rights of the first and the second generation. The examples are abundant: when a State or a nation wants to continue to exercise its authoritarian rule (based on no matter what kind of interests or traditions), it claims "the right to self-determination", understood as a collective right. This right is proclaimed in the two International Covenants on Human Rights voted in 1966: the one on Civil and Political Rights; and the other on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Both Covenants share the same first article, which says: "All people have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development".

There is a wide consensus on the validity of this right. The problem, however, appears when we start to discuss, what is a "people"? Is a government which has not been elected by the majority of the voting population of a country the legitimate representative of "the people"? Has Israel the right to determine for itself and also for the Palestinians? What is the significance of this principle for African peoples? Are the indigenous peoples of Latin America and the Pacific, or elsewhere, represented by the decisions of States which, arguing from the "national interest", don't recognize their claims?

To put it in terms of a crucial dilemma. Who has the right to develop: Brazil (as a nation) or the Yanomani people? This is a difficult problem which cannot be resolved by rhetoric alone.

A third issue is involved in the discussion about the right to develop: obviously development cannot occur without the solidarity of other peoples with those who want to develop. This affirmation is not only valid for development, but also for other human rights (for example, the struggle against the apartheid system in the Republic of South Africa was carried mainly by the Black South Africans, but with a lot of support from many other people in different parts of the world). The recognition of this fact calls for a better understanding of the importance of new lifestyles among people of the developed countries. As Rajni Kothari writes: "here lies the crux of the matter. Crucial to the effect of an unjust international economic order on the economies of the developing countries and the prospects for achieving adequate standard of living in these countries is the whole question of lifestyle and the extent to which it tends to structure relationships between and within nations. It is necessary to view the question of lifestyle as a fundamentally political issue, one that provides perhaps the most basic of all conflicts that inform today's world, the most important basis of stratification in the world - both internationally and domestically - and the most pertinent cause of the decline of human rights and fundamental freedoms in large parts of the world."¹⁰

To express solidarity to the victims of human rights violations demands to pay a price for them. In biblical terms, this is the implicit meaning of the parable of the good Samaritan. The price to pay is to restructure relations among peoples and human beings, in order that sharing becomes a criterion for life. This means to try to change the prevailing morality shaped by the imperatives of markets and efficiency. It means to move from self-interest to common interests,¹¹ a kind of rhetoric that is good, but which has no support from the people of the North or the élites of the South (and even among many of the poor all around the world as well!). If there is no shift in the prevailing patterns of lifestyles, the dream of liberalism (so fundamental for the implementation of the first generation of human rights) to create wealth for all the nations, or the hope of Marxism to create a world of equity and solidarity in a classless society, or even more the convictions of many religious movements of all the world, are then unavoidably undermined.

Fourth (and last), this brings me to say that the right to development, or the right to social justice, or any other right, depends substantially on our convictions and our will to pay the price for them. Even a prisoner under torture can practise the right to be free, rejecting the imposition of his or her torturers. This is a very costly exercise. If we really affirm the rights to develop and to social justice, then we have to affirm them with our actions.

It is a fact that there are dilemmas which seem to be unavoidable. The question is to be clear about our non-negotiable convictions (which in our case, as Christian believers, are grounded on the affirmations of Jesus Christ and the meaning of the biblical faith), to stand for them and to try to persuade others that they are valuable. It is through efforts of this kind, engaged in by people who have faith (no matter if it is theological or anthropological), that the cause of human rights progresses in the world . It is through efforts of this kind that the life of human beings is improved - a life which, for a saint like Irenaeus, is the expression of the glory of God.

Julio de Santa Ana is Professor Emeritus of Theology in the Methodist University of São Paulo, and currently works as an independent consultant.

Notes